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Abstract
The paper investigates a representational model for narratives, aiming to facilitate the acquisition
of the systematic core of stories concerning legal cases, i.e. the set of causal and temporal
relationships that govern the world in which the narrated scenario takes place. At the discourse
level, we consider narratives as sequences of messages collected in an observation, including
descriptions of agents, of agents’ behaviour and of mechanisms relative to physical, mental and
institutional domains. At the content level, stories correspond to synchronizations of embodied
agent-roles scripts. Following this approach, the Pierson v Post case is analyzed in detail and
represented as a Petri net.
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1 Introduction
Legal activity provides excellent examples of the operational use of narratives, for instance
in adjudication. The interaction between parties, witnesses, experts and judges includes
narrative acts. Moreover, if the case introduces a precedent, the publication of its proceedings
may be seen in itself as a narrative act, meant to inform the legal system of novelties
concerning social interactions and their legal interpretation. This phenomenon reproduces at
a systemic scale what happens in the daily legal practice, as legal experts usually rely on
prototypical or hypothetical cases when they explain or unravel a certain legal problem.
Our objective is therefore to investigate an adequate representational model for cases
(historical, hypothetical, etc.). At first sight, the domain of application is a specific class
of narratives, but, in reality, it is a structural component of all narratives, related to the
socio-institutional interpretation of behaviour; the approach we propose may be plausibly
used as well on folk tales, mythology, etc. if the motive is to investigate possible underlying
normative indications.
Background. Several models have been proposed in the literature in order to represent
stories, introducing concepts like story grammars [21], scripts [1], plot units [13], multi-
level representations [17], doxastic preferences [15], story intention graphs [9] etc. All
these contributions target structural components of narratives, primarily with the intent of
reproducing the in-depth knowledge mechanisms specifically behind story understanding,
story generation and summarization.Although the present work can be seen as a follow-up of
these contributions, our focus is slightly different.
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We are primarily targeting the knowledge involved in a certain (legal) case, taking into
account the possibility of receiving different explanations of a given sequence of events, usually
from different point of views, allowing to consider alternative interpretations of agents’ (legal)
positions and intentions. Assuming that a story exists in the mind of the narrator/listener,
we are mostly concerned by the problem of story acquisition, in the sense of acquiring the
interpreted content in a formal representation, eventually supported by specific diagramming
tools. Rather than text annotation practices, our elicitation model has more similarity with
scenario-based modeling, used in software engineering, e.g. [11]. This paper in particular
focuses on Petri nets.1
Knowledge acquisition is inherently coupled with finding the right representational model
for the target domain. As Lwe observes in [16], for instance, plot units can represent causality,
but not expectation; the doxastic preference framework, conversely, models the second, but
not the first. As we need both these features to adequately characterize social interactions,
this work proposes a possible solution.
The paper proceeds as follows. The theoretical framework is introduced incrementally,
starting with the narrative model (2) and with a case example of narrative. We define then
the story model (3), further refined with agent-role models (4). To conclude, we briefly
present the representation of the case as a Petri net (5). Discussion ends the paper.
2 The narrative model
Any narrative always manifests three ontological layers, present at the same time: the
discourse, the story and the conversation.2 They are respectively signal, meaning, and
relevant components of the social context—like knowledge/intents of narrator and listener—
that concur to the generation/interpretation of such act of communication. The “same”
story can be reported with different discourses, because the discourse defines the order and
the form (verbal and non-verbal) in which the content is provided. The specific choices
of transformation from story to discourse (in generation) and from discourse to story (in
interpretation) are influenced by the conversation layer.
The narrative content received by an interpreter is in the form of a sequence of messages,
which essentially correspond to speech acts [22]. The complete set of messages is called
observation and constitutes a superficial layer of meaning, reporting events, states, and
possibly explicit dependencies between them, i.e. the foreground mechanisms. In general,
the interpreter has to integrate this content with other background components in order to
complete the model with dependencies and facts that are missing in the narration, but he
recognizes as relevant to explain its occurrence.3
Narratives often contain characters that tell something. In respect to these quoted or
indirect speeches, which possibly constitute nested narratives, the higher-level story (brought
by the narrator) may include parts of their discourse and clues about their conversation
layers (e.g. position, knowledge, intentions of the participants).
1 From a wider perspective, however, we target an integrated development invironment (IDE) accounting
multiple views, and allowing an incremental refinement of the elicited content. We give a preliminary
example in [25], referring to UML diagrams (Message Sequence Charts), topology diagrams, Petri nets
and scripts in AgentSpeak(L), a logic programming language for cognitive agents.
2 The introduction of story/discourse distinction is usually associated to the Structuralists (Barthes,
Todorov, Genette, etc.). Before them, the Russian formalists (Propp, Shklovsky) used the terms
fabula/syuzhet. For the use of the term conversation, see for instance Young in [27]; other authors prefer
narration.
3 Based on these concepts, we presented in [26] a preliminary implementation of the process of interpreta-
tion, constructed on explanation-based argumentation.
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I Example 1. As example of narrative, we consider a well known case in Property Law and
in AI & Law [6]: Pierson v Post (1805)4. The story is basically the following:
Post was hunting a fox with a horse and hounds in a wild and uninhabited land, and
was about to catch it, but Pierson, although conscious of Post’s pursuit, intercepted,
killed and took the animal.
Both claimed the fox, the first appeal had found for Post, but this court reverted the
previous result. The different positions are expressed by two judges: Tompkins (majority)
and Livingston (dissent). The first, supported by classical jurisprudence, claims that:
Tompkins: Possession of a fera naturae occurs only if there is occupancy, i.e. taking
physical possession. Pierson took the animal, so he owns it.
where fera naturae is an animal wild by nature. The second argues that:
Livingston: If someone starts and hunts a fox with hounds in a vast and uninhabited
land has a right of taking the fox on any other person who saw he was pursuing it.
Both interpretations are relevant for our purposes, and create two different stories (also in a
practical sense, as they would bring about different consequences). The two judges can be
seen as playing the role of two different modelers, providing different mechanisms.5
3 The story model
In narratology the story layer is usually called the fabula: “a series of logically and chrono-
logically related events [..]” [4]. This name dates back to Propp, which, altogether with the
Russian formalists, started considering each event in the story as functional, i.e. a part of a
whole sequence, necessary to bring the narrated world from initial conditions to a certain
conclusion.
Following this perspective, as first definition, we may consider the story as a chain of
events (a strictly ordered set):
E = {e1, e2, ..., en} (1)
In addition, specific circumstances may be described in correspondence to the occurrence of
an event. A more complete definition of story should consider the following chain:
C0
e1→ C1 e2→ ... en→ Cn (2)
where ei are associated to transitions and Ci is a set of conditions assumed to continue
at least until the occurrence of ei. Amongst those continuants we find also existents, as
characters, objects, etc.
4 Source text: http://www.facstaff.bucknell.edu/kinnaman/Piersonv.htm.
5 In these terms, court proceedings can be seen as pushing to the public foreground institutional
mechanisms not adequately defined in certain contexts. See [14] about the role of narratives in respect
to tacit knowledge.
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Plot. The definition of story given above seems quite simple, but the manifold relations
between consequence (logical, causal) and consecutiveness (informed by time, ordering,
verbal tense) are actually very delicate to assess. Furthermore, two different chronological
coordinates coexist in a narrative: a story-relative time, i.e. when the event has occurred in
the story, and a discourse-relative time, i.e. when that event has been reported/observed.
The concept of plot is relevant in this issue.6 Trying to better scope the problem, we
identify three levels of constraints on the ordering of events via the following method, first
presented in [25] but hereby slightly refined:
1. We identify the events and conditions explicitly expressed in the story.
2. For each event, we identify which conditions/events in the story are direct requirement and
consequence of its occurrence. If necessary, we integrate them with external knowledge.
The relations elicited in this way constitute the dependencies (causal, logical) and place
some strong constraints on the ordering of events.
3. Time positions, durations and use of verbal tenses in the narration are usually meant to
give some landmark to the reader/listener. They are described in absolute or relative
terms. Once interpreted, they create a relation between events/conditions contingent to
the story. 7 The correspondent positioning constitutes the medium constraints.
4. When we do not have any other information, a possible sequence is suggested by the
discourse-relative time, i.e. relative position in which the events are given. The con-
sequent representational outcome is contingent to the discourse and provides the weak
constraints on the ordering of events. They complement the ordering resulting from
the medium constraints.
In the previous section, we presented the story as a strict ordered set of events. However,
it is easy to object to such a strict determination: (a) dependencies can be associated to
no-time-consuming processes (e.g. logical dependencies); (b) events may occur simultaneously,
when triggered by parallel sub-systems (e.g. two agents acting independently), unless there
is an explicit temporal determination. Consequently, we weaken the previous strict temporal
constraints (from ei+1 > ei to ei+1 ≥ ei) at least in these two cases. With these modifications,
the set of events E defined in (1) becomes a partially ordered set.
Evidently, most of the strong constraints proposed in step 2 are relative to the reader, as
only some of these dependencies are explicitly presented by the narrator. They respectively
define the background and foreground mechanisms of the story-system. Conversely, the
medium and weak constraints are always explicitly addressed in the narrative and can be
objectively extracted as intrinsic component of the observation. They describe contingent
relations, which are also contextual when they are part of the synchronization: i.e. the
necessary alignment with the mechanisms for the story to occur.8 Suggested by the term
control-flow in programming, we call the whole composition of constraints story-flow.
6 Unfortunately, there are conflicting accounts about its definition in the literature. For some authors the
plot coincide with how things are presented, and therefore it practically equals the discourse. According
to an older tradition, usually associated to Forster [10], the story properly said is only the chronological
sequence of events, while the plot is the causal and logical structure connecting them.
7 Contingent to the story/discourse means that even if this specific story/discourse reports this ordering,
a priori, there may be as well stories in which an alternative ordering holds.
8 Considered as a whole, however, constraints may be conflicting. When this occurs, it is a symptom of a
problem with the mechanisms and/or with the observation. There might be dependencies which are
missing, not valid or not acceptable in that specific context, or there may be faults in the timing or the
nature of the reported events. Not addressed in this paper, this problem is one of the objects of our
current research on model-based diagnosis and justification [25].
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I Example 2. Applying the method on the “brute” story9 of Pierson v Post, we have:
conditions and events: Post hunting (c1), Post being in an uninhabited land (c2), Post
catching the fox (c3), Pierson being conscious of Post’s pursuit (c4), Pierson intercepting
the fox (e1), Pierson killing the fox (e2), Pierson taking the fox (e3)
strong constraints: e1 < e2 < e3 (intercept, kill, take necessarily occur in this order)
medium constraints: {c1, c2, c3} e1→ {}, {c4} e1→ {}
weak constraints: e1 < e2 < e3
Conditions like ‘Post hunting’ refer to ongoing actions which started in an undefined
moment before the given story occurs. Note how the weak constraints reproduce the strong
constraints: this is a natural tendency. In general, however, other events may occur in the
story with no relevance for the causal mechanisms applied by the interpreter or with no
specific ordering necessity.
Talking about mechanisms, the judges propose two institutional interpretations, which,
added to the previous strong constraints, produce two alternative stories:
{c6} e3→ {c7}: the fox being a wild animal (c6), the event of Pierson taking the fox (e3)
makes Pierson owner of the animal (c7);
{c1, c2, c4}→{c8}: Post hunting in an uninhabited land (c1 and c2), and Pierson conscious
of his pursuit (c4) gives Post an exclusive right to catch the prey (c8), and, consequently,
Pierson is not permitted to.
The last constraint involves only conditions, it is a logical dependency; it can be translated
similarly to the others if we take into account some condition-activating event, for instance
the last one (Pierson becoming aware of Post’s hunting).
4 The agent-role model
So far, the foundational structure of the story model consists of events, generic continuant
entities and relations between them. Amongst continuant entities, characters are particularly
important in narratives, as they connect events all throughout the story with their direct or
indirect participation in actions.
Similarly to Propp, who, investigating Russian folk-tales [20], abstracted characters to
roles defined by recurrent patterns of actions (the Villain, the Hero, etc.), we abstract agents
to agent-roles (first presented in [8]). Agent-roles are roles, as they refer to prototypical
patterns of behaviour (correspondent or building on top of roles defined by institutions),
and they are agents, because their behaviour is described via cognitive and motivational
components. In previous works [25, 24], we presented a multi-layered framework to be used
for the characterization of agent-roles, summarized in Table 1.
Integrating some fundamental mechanisms inspired by BDI architectures (beliefs-desires-
intentions) we relate the primary elements of each layer with catalyzers and with components
of other layers, in order to construct a more in-depth representation of the strong constraints.
The layers essentially reproduce the general story scheme used by Bex and Verheij in [7],
and synthetizing in turn what was proposed by Pennington and Hastie in [19]:
Motive→ Goal→ Action→ Consequences
9 We are referring to Searle’s theory on institutions [22], which distinguishes brute, raw facts—in the
sense of belonging to the world of experience—from institutional facts, i.e. facts which are meaningful
within an institutional framework. Only some of the brute facts count as institutional fact, depending
on constitutive rules.
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Table 1 Multi-layered framework to be used for the characterization of agent-roles.
Primary elements Catalyzer elements
Motivational layer Motive Motivation
Intentional layer Intention Affordance (perceived power)
Action layer Action, Attempt Disposition (actual power)
Signal layer Message, Outcome –
This scheme serves as a template to model the behaviour of each agent. In general, however,
the complete decomposition is not fully expressed in a narrative, but retroactively occurs in
the mind of the interpreter, helped by narrative clues and following his own conceptualization
of the world.
In order to trace the relevant dependencies, we follow a methodology consisting in the
elicitation of (a) motives: we identify the events which are reasons for action; (b) contextual
affordances: we write down which conditions, in this story-world, are sufficient for an agent
to consider to be successful in starting a course of actions aiming to a certain intent; in doing
this, we reconstruct as well the course of actions as a hierarchical plan; (c) dispositional rules,
modeling the agent-independent dependencies holding in the story-world. Obviously different
modelers may provide alternative solutions. However, for our acquisition purposes, we take
a neutral perspective toward the problem of deciding which are the “right” mechanisms
representing the world: if the story-model, when executed, reproduces the messages given
with the observation, it is valid.
I Example 3. Executing these elicitation tasks on our story, a possible result is:
for both Pierson and Post the core action is catching/taking the fox. A possible initiating
motive is having seen the fox (not explicitly given), while the motivation would be
associated to their involvement in a hunting activity or their proneness to hunt;
the affordance of the core action, in respect to this story-world, is hidden to the reader.
We assume that both of them thinks that they are able to take the fox in those conditions.
The specific sequence of actions to be executed can be easily reconstructed via a chain of
dependencies: e.g. you can take the fox, if you kill it; you can kill it, if you intercept it;
if someone has already caught the fox, nobody can physically take it any more.
Institutional characterization. Institutional power (in legal terms also called ability) and
permission can be described similarly to affordance, as they are assumed to be taken into
account by the agent when he decides whether to proceed on a certain behaviour. The
former is necessary for the action to be recognized by the social system; the latter identifies
the liability of the agent to some enforcement action in case of violation.10 For the sake of
brevity, we redirect the reader to [23] for further support on these claims.
Expectations, failures and successes. Relations as powers, obligations and permissions
can be used to describe expectations about the social behaviour of the others in terms of
normative possibility and necessity, just as affordances describe (expected) possibilities of
action to agents in a certain environment, and dispositional rules describe the laws of a
certain world. If the agent starts an action and is not successful in achieving his intent, then
he acknowledges a practical failure. If the agent performs an act he considers institutionally
10On the other side, obligations not yet fulfilled are prototypical motives for action for the addressee of
the obligation. As permissions, they are generally associated to some form of enforcement.
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Figure 1 Simplified Petri Net representation of Pierson v Post.
meaningful, but this is eventually not recognized as such, he has still failed in respect to his
intents. If the agent intentionally performs an act which is not permitted or does not satisfy
a given duty, there is an institutional failure, but if the intended outcome is still successfully
established, then it will still be a practical success for him, even if enforcement actions may
reduce the general pay-off. The interactions between intents, practical/social expectations
and actual outcome entail the failures or successes for the agents, also in social terms.
5 Translating the story-flow as a Petri Net
Within the formalisms used in computation, Petri nets11 are one of the best established tools
for process modeling and analysis. They mirror the definition of story model we constructed
above, because they allow to explicitly divide conditions (represented with places) from events
(with transitions), and reproduce changes of state via the movement of tokens, respecting
the partial ordering property we associated to the story-model.
We have reported in Fig. 1 a simplified representation of our case story, obtained from the
composition of its constraints, in order to informally explain the construction principles of
our proposal. Three macro-areas can be recognized. The first, the message layer, corresponds
to the central line, and contains the events/conditions provided by the observation. The
arcs on this line chronologically reproduce the synchronization between external and internal
events. Agents or other parallel subsystems (in our case, Pierson and Post) start together
with the message layer and interact through it.12 Their subnets contain elements belonging
to all other three layers described in 4.
11A Petri net is a directed, bipartite graph with two types of nodes: places (visualized as circles) and
transitions (bars). A place is connected only to transitions and vice-versa. One or more tokens (black
dots) can reside in each place, while transitions can be fired, moving those tokens from their input places
to their output places. Petri nets furnish a direct visual representation of the causal structure (via the
network) and of the behaviour (via the movement of tokens) of the system.
12The picture shows some fundamental patterns. For example, a simple “writing” pattern is attached
to “going to inhabited land” place; a simple “reading” pattern connects the transition “fox appears to
Pearson” with the transition after “seeking foxes”; a complete communication pattern, which separates
emission from reception, surrounds the “fox taken by Pierson” place. See [25] for other examples.
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The core action starts when the fox appears to Pierson (black box). Pierson acknowledges
it, as he is seeking for foxes (and therefore is prone/motivated to see them), and commits
himself to the catch, executing a specific sequence of actions. On the other side, Post was
already trying to catch the fox. We modeled Post’s institutional thinking (highlighted with
the grey boxes), assumed to be similar to Livingston’s interpretation. Post started the action
as Pierson, but the Petri net shows also that he infers the institutional power to take it, before
he attempts to (left box). The same mechanism is hereafter applied to Pierson’s intervention
(right box), but is defeated by a second mechanism which gives Post the exclusive right on
the prey. From Post’s perspective, the event of taking the fox is therefore not only a practical
failure, but also a social failure.
6 Discussion
The paper introduces several elements towards an alternative framework for narratives:
by integrating intentions and institutional concepts we are able to increase the deepness
of the representation in order to model motivational and social aspects of stories, relevant
to describe legal cases, but usually not explicitly targeted in other formal accounts;
the use of Petri nets as underlying computational model makes the story-model execution
a direct possibility, useful as well for real-time visual debugging and validating purposes.
Other contributions referring to Petri net have been proposed for story plot generation in
games [5] and for narrative comprehension [18, 12]. Although they have similarities with
our approach (in particular the latter), the first describes only higher-level specifications,
the second focuses with much further detail on narrative discourse components, while we
focus on the acquisition of the “systematic” structural core of an interpreted story;
causations and expectations are integrated in the same framework, overcoming mutual
limitations of other frameworks (cf. [16]); furthermore, the connection with concepts as
affordances, power, permission/obligation is, as far as we know, a novelty in the domain;
the difference between expectation and actual outcome — which eventually defines failure
or success for a character — is evaluated within the model itself. Therefore, the narrative
analyst is not concerned anymore by this meta-interpretation, as occurs instead in plot
units [13] or in story intention graphs (the “affectual” components) [9];
rather than static script-like knowledge to be used in story-understanding, we focus on
acquiring from modelers different interpretations of the fabula; assessing a case with
alternative interpretations is just a daily practice in legal activity, and our representational
framework aims to collect the correspondent mechanisms.
Obviously, the increase of knowledge requirements corresponds to increased effort in the
modeling exercise. Ideally, this should not be a problem with end-users as law students and
experts working on a legal scenario, because the visualization of the mechanisms produces
also the direct effect of clarifying and validating the ideas of the modeler. In this direction,
the choice of relying on visual programming practices aims to help the interaction with
non-IT experts.
Moreover, we think there are two other reasons why the impact may be less critical than
it seems. On the one hand, the elicitation of mechanisms is mostly targeting the affordances
and dispositions related to actions/events, which are the fundamental components of practical
rationality. We assume nobody should have particular problems with this part, if supported
with an adequate acquisition platform. The composition of constraints, which is a more
delicate and complex task, can be instead supported computationally (problems known in
AI as configuration and model-based diagnosis). On the other hand, once a story is collected,
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its mechanisms can be reused with another story. Evidently, in some cases part of those
mechanisms would not directly apply; in such situation, the modeler will be obliged to
define distinguishing features. This incremental, constructive approach reflects essentially
the nature of case law. However, the overall impact of these potentially positive interactions
with the knowledge acquisition bottleneck issue remains to be investigated in the future.
Some final remarks about a related domain. Traditionally, legal case-based reasoning
binds the modeling of cases to dimensions (HYPO [3]) and factors (CATO [2]), i.e. concepts
which translate legally significant aspects of the cases. The story behind the case and its
construction is therefore neglected, apart from relevant components extracted by the analyst.
The analyst is then the one responsible for finding the analogies and for placing the case in
the right abstraction. Potentially, our framework could automatize part of this process, if
the case-base is adequately rich and we implement an adequate measure of similarity.
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